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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-1473 
 ___________ 
 




ATTORNEY GENERAL OF 
THE UNITED STATES, Respondent 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
 Board of Immigration Appeals 
 (Agency No. A088-769-810) 
 Immigration Judge:  Honorable Annie S. Garcy 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
August 1, 2011 
 
 Before:  AMBRO, GREENAWAY, JR. and GREENBERG, Circuit 
 
Judges 







 Shiva Saran Thapa petitions for review of a decision by the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (“BIA”) to dismiss his appeal of an immigration judge’s decision denying his 
applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention 
2 
 
Against Torture (“CAT”).  For the reasons that follow, we will deny the petition for 
review. 
I. 
 Thapa, a citizen of Nepal, entered the United States without inspection in April 
2008.  The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) issued him a Notice to Appear 
charging that he was removable under Section 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(1) of the Immigration & 
Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(1), as an alien who was 
inadmissible at the time of entry. Thapa conceded that he was inadmissible as charged 
and applied for asylum, withholding of removal under the INA, and protection under the 
CAT.  He claimed that he feared persecution by Maoists in his home country on account 
of his membership in the Nepali Congress Party. 
 In December 2009, an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) determined that Thapa’s hearing 
testimony conflicted with statements given at his credible fear interview and in his 
asylum application, and that he had attempted to enhance his claims of persecution by 
adding physical abuse to his description of one incident of alleged persecution and 
describing for the first time another.  Because the IJ therefore found that Thapa lacked 
credibility, she held that he had failed to carry his burden of proof for any of the relief he 
sought. 
 Thapa appealed to the BIA and, while that appeal was pending, filed a motion to 
reopen the matter on the basis of his counsel’s ineffectiveness.  The BIA construed 
Thapa’s motion to reopen to be a motion to remand and denied it due to his failure to 
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comply with the BIA’s requirements to bring an ineffectiveness claim.  The BIA also 
found no clear error in the Immigration Judge’s adverse credibility determination, and 
dismissed his appeal.  Thapa now petitions this Court for review. 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction to review a final order of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a)(1).  See Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 548 (3d Cir. 2001).  We review 
factual findings, including any credibility determinations, under a substantial evidence 
standard.  See Cao v. Att’y Gen., 407 F.3d 146, 152 (3d Cir. 2005).  Under that standard, 
we must uphold the BIA’s decision unless the evidence not only supports a contrary 
conclusion, but compels it.  See Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 483-84 (3d Cir. 
2001).  An applicant bears the burden of proving eligibility for asylum.  Shardar v. Att’y 
Gen., 503 F.3d 308, 312 (3d Cir. 2007).1  We review the BIA’s decision to deny a motion 
to remand for abuse of discretion.  Korytnyuk v. Ashcroft
                                              
1Because Thapa filed his asylum application after the enactment of the REAL ID Act, 
the inconsistencies, inaccuracies, or falsehoods upon which the adverse credibility 
finding is based need not go to the heart of his claim. See Lin v. Att’y Gen., 543 F.3d 
114, 119 n.5 (3d Cir. 2008). Rather, the REAL ID Act permits credibility   
determinations to be based on observations of Thapa’s demeanor, the plausibility of 
his story, and the consistency of his statements. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); 
Gabuniya v. Att’y Gen., 463 F.3d 316, 322 n.7 (3d Cir. 2006).  We have not applied 
the REAL ID Act standard in a precedential opinion.  Here, because the 
inconsistencies identified by the IJ relate to the heart of Thapa’s claims for relief, and 
would thus support an adverse credibility determination even under the pre-REAL ID 
Act standard, we need not consider whether 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) is consistent 
with due process. See Wang v. Holder, 569 F.3d 531, 538 (5th Cir. 2009) (canvassing 
Circuit law on the provision). 




2003).   
III. 
  The government argues that Thapa did not adequately raise the issue of the IJ’s 
credibility determination before the BIA and that any claims he raises before us regarding 
that issue are therefore unexhausted and beyond our jurisdiction.  See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(d)(1).  Thapa’s brief notice of appeal, along with his motion to remand, sufficed 
to place the BIA on notice that Thapa intended to raise a claim that the IJ’s credibility 
determination, the sole basis on which the IJ denied all forms of relief, was not based 
upon substantial evidence.  Dan Hua Wu v. Att’y Gen., 571 F.3d 314, 317 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(“So long as a[] . . . petitioner makes some effort, however insignificant, to place the 
[BIA] on notice of a straightforward issue being raised on appeal, a petitioner is deemed 
to have exhausted her administrative remedies.”) (quoting Lin v. Att’y Gen.
 We conclude that substantial evidence supports the decision to reject Thapa’s 
credibility.  He presented materially different accounts of his encounters with Maoists:  at 
his credible fear interview he stated that they had only verbally threatened him and had 
not physically harmed him, but testified before the IJ that they had beaten him so badly 
, 543 F.3d 
114, 121 (3d Cir. 2008)).  In fact, the BIA addressed merits of that claim in its opinion.  
Accordingly, we hold that Thapa has adequately exhausted the claim that the IJ’s 
credibility determination was not based upon substantial evidence.  To the extent he 
raises other claims regarding this determination, they are unexhausted and beyond our 
jurisdiction.  8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1). 
5 
 
that he experienced back pain for four days and was unable to walk properly for a week.  
He also recharacterized his dealings with his former business partner: at the credible fear 
interview he stated that his partner had threatened him over a debt and that he had not 
reported the threats to the police because it was unimportant, but in his testimony he 
claimed that his partner was a Maoist and that he didn’t report the threats to the police 
because of his partner’s political affiliation.2  The record thus supports the IJ’s 
determination that Thapa had enhanced aspects of his claims of persecution and was not 
credible.  It likewise supports the determination that Thapa failed to meet his burden to 
demonstrate that he was entitled to relief.  See
  Thapa also argues that the BIA abused its discretion by holding that he failed to 
demonstrate that he had followed the procedural requirements set forth in 
 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B). 
Matter of 
Lozada, 19 I.&.N. Dec. 637 (BIA 1988), aff’d, 857 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1988), and denying 
his motion to remand.  Under Lozada
                                              
2 Thapa argues that the IJ improperly relied on his credible fear interview in making 
an adverse credibility determination. In support of this argument, he cites 
Balasubramanrim v. INS, 143 F.3d 157, 164 (3d Cir. 1998).  There, we held that 
inconsistencies between a statement from an airport interview and in-court testimony 
before an IJ cannot alone support an adverse credibility finding.  Thapa apparently 
argues that the IJ abused her discretion by failing to sua sponte inquire into whether 
the credible fear interview was akin to an airport interview.  We have never held this 
to be the case.  In any event, because this argument was not raised in his motion to 
, an alien wishing to raise an ineffectiveness claim 
must (1) provide an affidavit attesting to the relevant facts, (2) inform former counsel of 
the allegations and allow him an opportunity to respond, and (3) provide either a 
statement that a complaint against counsel has been filed with the appropriate disciplinary 
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authority or a reasonable explanation of why that did not happen.  Id. at 639.  Thapa 
argues that he should have been allowed to proceed with his motion because he asserted 
that he had informed his prior counsel of his ineffectiveness claim, and the BIA abused 
its discretion by requiring evidence of his compliance with Lozada.  We have never held 
that a petitioner’s unsupported assertion that he has complied with the Lozada 
requirements suffices to proceed with an ineffective assistance claim in this context, and 
will not do so now.  Cf. Rranci v. Att’y Gen., 540 F.3d 165, 173 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding 
that a signed affidavit indicating that prior counsel had been informed of the 
ineffectiveness allegations was sufficient evidence of compliance with the requirements).  
The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Thapa’s motion to remand.3
IV. 
 
 For the reasons we have given, we will deny Thapa’s petition for review. 
  
                                                                                                                                                  
remand or notice of appeal, we lack jurisdiction.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1). 
3 In any event, even if Thapa had demonstrated his compliance with the Lozado 
requirements, the BIA still would have denied his motion.  Thapa’s motion argued 
only that his attorney was ineffective for failing to provide additional corroborative 
evidence to the IJ; because the IJ explicitly held that her decision was not based on a 
lack of corroboration, that evidence would not have affected the outcome of the 
proceedings.  The BIA therefore correctly noted in its opinion that Thapa could not 
demonstrate that his counsel’s performance prejudiced him.  Thus, even if the BIA 
had abused its discretion by requiring evidence of Thapa’s compliance with Lozada, 
its error would have been harmless.  Li Hua Yuan v. Att’y Gen., — F.3d —, 2011 WL 
1519200, at *5 (3d Cir. Apr. 22, 2011) (“We will view an error as harmless and not 
necessitating a remand to the BIA when it is highly probable that the error did not 
affect the outcome of the case.”). 
